

MAIN STAFF OF THE ARMY OF REPUBLIKA SRPSKA
SECTOR FOR INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
INTELLIGENCE ADMINISTRATION

Strictly confidential no. 12/45-770

21 June 1995

VERY URGENT

DK /Drina Corps/ COMMAND – INTELLIGENCE DEPARTMENT
(for the 10th DOD /Sabotage Detachment/ Commander)

Order for engagement of the 10th DOD

1. On 21 June 1995 start intensive preparations to carry out sabotage operations in the coming period against selected targets.

Work out a detailed plan by 1000 hours on 22 June 1995 and brief me about the decision at 1200 hours on 22 June 1995.

The Commander of the 10th DOD and the Chief of the Drina Corps Intelligence Department will be responsible to be for collecting information, planning and carrying out the task.

2. After detailed reconnaissance and making a decision, commence with tactical practice of the detachment on similar facilities.

3. Coordination between units in contact will be done by the Chief of the Drina Corps Intelligence Department and he will be in charge of the whole action.

4. Inform the Drina Corps NŠ /Chief of Staff/ about the task.

5. Engage the whole detachment for the execution of the task. Complete the task (action) within 10 to 15 minutes. Infiltration of the detachment should be done at night and the surprise attack just before dawn. The exact time is to be decided by the Detachment Commander with the approval of the Drina Corps Chief of ObOd /Intelligence Department/.

Pullout of the detachment is to be done along the same route as it was infiltrated, with the help of a smoke screen.

6. In carrying out the task, strictly adhere to the following:

- There should be no danger to UNPROFOR members;
- Avoid causing casualties among women and children;
- Capturing live sources is obligatory;
- In case any member of the detachment is either wounded or killed, his body must be recovered at all cost, not a single soldier may fall into enemy hands;
- Prior to setting off for the task, remove all identification documents from all soldiers;
- Ensure complete secrecy of the operation as to its location and time;
- Use communications equipment only after giving the signal to start the operation and only by using TKT /secret commanding of troops/;
- Work out several options and alternative routes for the pullout; if necessary, ensure artillery support from units in contact and decide on a signal for the planned fire.

C H I E F

C o l o n e l

Petar SALAPURA

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<u>RECEIVED:</u>	21 June	1995	1550 hours
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DRAFT TRANSLATION